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The expected value of information in a standard portfolio investment problem with ex-post payment can
increase when the information is garbled prior to its sale. Distorting the information helps to resolve the incentive
problem decreasing the buyer’s default risk and thereby increasing the seller’s expected revenues.
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1. Introduction
In decision problems where an agent’s payoff depends on an exogenous random event, an informative
signal about this event is valuable if it permits the agent to adjust her actions. The more informative the
signal is in the sense of statistical sufficiency, the more valuable it is to an agent who uses it directly
(Blackwell, 1953). We consider situations where an agent sells information to an investor and shows that
the expected revenues from the sale may be non-monotonic in its informativeness. As an example we
consider the sale of information in a simple portfolio investment problem, where the payment for the
information is made after the return is realized, subject to limited liability. In the interesting case where
no upfront payments for the information are permitted, we show that garbling the information (Marschak
and Miyasawa, 1968) can strictly increase expected revenues for the seller by influencing the investor’s0165-1765/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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substitute for missing contract dimensions such as ex-ante payment.1
Demski and Sappington (1986) provide an early application of strategic information garbling to
influence agent action in a labor market delegation context, focusing on the timing of information release
(rather than endogenizing its quality) and making simplifying assumptions about the allowable types of
contracts. While limited liability has long been known to distort incentives in principal-agent situations
(Fama and Miller, 1972; Sappington, 1983) and strategic information transmission has been shown to be
generally useful in games (Aumann and Hart, 2003; Crawford and Sobel, 1982), information garbling
has not, to our knowledge, been invoked as a contracting instrument to address the incentive distortion
caused by limited liability.2. The model
Consider a risk-averse investor with a twice differentiable Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
function u, so that uW< 0 < uV. She can invest a portion aa[0, w] of her wealth w in a risky asset of
random return r˜a{r1, r2}, where r1a( 1, 0) and r2> r1. Initially the investor believes the return
realizations are equally likely (uniform prior) and her utility maximization yields a unique optimal
investment action of 2 a0*=[a0
u][0, w], where a0
u is defined as the unique ‘‘unconstrained’’ solution of the
first-order necessary optimality condition E½r˜uVðwþ au0r˜Þ ¼ 0. The ‘‘no-information’’ investment a0* is
always strictly greater than zero since the expected return from the risky asset is positive; it defines the
investor’s expected no-information utility u¯0 ¼ Euðwþ a0*r˜Þ.
A risk-neutral information seller offers to sell the investor a signal s˜afL; Hg, imperfectly correlated
with r˜, where Probðs˜ ¼ LÞ ¼ rL, Probðs˜ ¼ HÞ ¼ rH ¼ 1 rL, and Probðs˜ ¼ jjr˜ ¼ riÞ ¼ qij for ia{1, 2}
and ja{L, H}. If she were to purchase the signal, the investor would update her initial beliefs according
to Bayes’ rule and obtain the posterior return distribution pij ¼ Probðr˜ ¼ rijs˜ ¼ jÞ ¼ qij=ð2rjÞ . The
posted price p for the information is to be paid by the buyer after the return has been realized; its
collection is subject to limited liability, in the sense that the information seller can at most claim all of the
investor’s remaining wealth.3 The investor’s expected utility after purchasing the information, observing
the signal realization ja{L, H} and choosing an investment level aja[0, w] is therefore
u¯jðp; ajÞ ¼
X
i
pijuð½w pþ ajriþÞ; ð1Þ1 Arrow (1962) (p. 111) pointed out that sellers of information needed to overcome both problems of adverse selection
(buyers who fear they will receive low-quality information from sellers will not pay upfront) and moral hazard (buyers who,
having had information revealed to them, refuse to pay), making both ex-ante and ex-post charges problematic. Ex-ante fees for
information of unknown value are, in practice, uncommon, whereas ex-post charges reflective of the information value abound.
Free trials of information products such as software are the norm; hedge funds and venture capital firms, who bundle private
information with financial management services, typically charge 20% of ex-post profits (‘‘carry’’) rather than up-front sales
loads, and risk losing their carry if the portfolio’s investments deteriorate. Recent work by Che and Gale (2000) indicates that
partial ex-ante payments (which they term ‘‘cash bonds’’) can serve as a valuable signal of buyer wealth (allowing a more
precise design of a pricing mechanism) rather than a method of conveying cash per se.
2 The [][0,w] operator is defined for a given w>0 and any naR as [n][0,w] =max{0, min {w, n}}, truncating the value of n to
the admissible interval [0,w].
3 In this model we suppose however that neither the investment actions a nor their results are directly contractible.
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be written as
max
p
X
i;j
rjpij min fp; ½wþ aj*riþg; ð2Þ
subject to both the investor’s individual-rationality constraint,
rLu¯Lðp; aL*Þ þ rHu¯Hðp; aH*Þzu¯0; ð3Þ
and her incentive-compatibility constraint,
aj*aarg max
aja½0;w
u¯jðp; ajÞ: ð4Þ
The denominations of the signal realizations L (‘‘bad news’’) and H (‘‘good news’’) are chosen
such that aL*V aH*. The investor’s optimal informed investment in each state is obtained from
(4), aj*a{[aj
u][0,w], w}, where aj
u is defined analogously to a0
u as the interior optimum. The
optimal investment aj* is thus equal to either the amount aj
u determined by the first-order condition for
maximizing u¯j (truncated to the interval [0, w]) or her full wealth, w.
4 The investor prefers the latter, i.e.
she ‘‘goes for broke’’, if the expected gain from increasing investment to the maximum possible is
sufficiently ‘‘protected’’ by her limited payment liability in the case of a low return realization (Fama
and Miller, 1972): the non-concavity of the investor’s utility at the origin, introduced by limited
liability, renders a threshold investment policy optimal (Gollier et al., 1997). If the no-information
utility u¯0 is small enough, the seller can choose p satisfying (3) such that the investor chooses an
action in the ‘‘good news’’ signal state H which leads to default for the negative return realization r1.
The prospect of such (partial) default through limited liability, escaping the consequences of a low
return realization, implies that the investor will invest all her remaining wealth in the risky asset,
aH* =w. Thus, the investor takes full advantage of the unsecured ‘‘loan’’ granted by the information
seller through payment deferral. In stark contrast to this full commitment, the information seller would
prefer the investor not to invest at all whenever her choice implies a risk of default on the ex-post
payment.3. Garbling may increase revenue
We now argue that to deter the investor from going for broke, the seller can distort the information
by garbling his signal, mis-reporting its realizations. Instead of reporting both states L and H truthfully,
the information seller can misreport realizations L with probability a as H, whereas realizations H are
always reported truthfully. The new optimization problem with a-garbling includes the original4 By the maximum theorem (Berge, 1959) the maximizer aj* is upper hemicontinuous as a function of p. Indeed at the point
of ‘‘switch’’ between interior investment aj
u and full investment w, the maximizer is in fact a set containing both aj
u and w as
elements.
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investor are
rˆHðaÞ ¼ rH þ arL;
rˆLðaÞ ¼ ð1 aÞrL:
In an a-garbling environment the investor adjusts her posterior beliefs given a report of H to
pˆiHðaÞ ¼ rHpiH þ arLpiLrH þ arL ;
whereas given a report of L her beliefs are not influenced by the garbling, pˆiL ¼ piL. Since the a-garbling
affects the investor only following a report of ‘‘good news’’ and p2HV (a)V 0, it produces a posterior
return distribution that is dominated, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, by the undistorted
posterior distribution at a= 0 leading the investor to (weakly) lower investment actions and thereby
decreasing her propensity to go for broke.
Consider the interesting case where aˆuHð0Þ < w. The price pˆðaÞ at which the investor is indifferent
between investing an interior amount aˆuHðaÞ and all her wealth, w, is implicitly defined by5
uˆHðpˆðaÞ; aˆuj ðaÞ; aÞ ¼ uˆHðpˆðaÞ; w; aÞ; ð5Þ
where for ja{L, H} the signal-contingent expected utility uˆjðp; aj; aÞ is determined as in Eq. (1) with pij
and rj replaced by pˆijðaÞ and rˆðaÞ respectively. Similarly, aˆuj ðaÞ is determined in analogy to aju, so that
E½r˜uVðw pþ aˆuj ðaÞr˜Þ ¼ 0: We denote by p¯ the expected revenue from posting the maximal
individually rational price (without garbling). In order for an a-garbling to yield a revenue improvement
for the seller we require that6
pˆðaÞzp¯: ð6Þ
The price pˆðaÞ is thereby individually rational for the investor, if
uˆðpˆðaÞ; aÞzu¯0; ð7Þ
where uˆðpˆðaÞ; aÞ ¼ rˆLðaÞuˆLðpˆ; aˆL*ðaÞ; aÞ þ rˆHðaÞuˆHðpˆ; aˆH* ðaÞ; aÞ. The main result of the paper, that a
revenue-improving garbling exists under these conditions, follows by construction.5 In the event of ‘‘bad news’’ there may also exist a price at which the investor is indifferent between going for broke and
choosing an interior maximizer. Going for broke in the low signal state, however, implies a =w in the high signal state as well.
At any underlying non-negative price the individual rationality constraint cannot be satisfied, since a signal that induces the
same action in all its states is inherently worthless, even under limited liability.
6 If pˆð0Þ < p¯, then a simple price decrease may not deter the investor from going for broke and a minimum garbling am>0
may be needed to yield any possible increase in the seller’ revenue. If p¯ < wð1þ r1Þ, then the investor cannot default and has
no incentive to go for broke, in which case p¯ corresponds to the seller’s optimal revenue.
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(5)–(7) are satisfied. (ii) The a*-garbling is optimal, i.e. maximizes the information seller’s revenue over
all aa[0, 1], if in addition to (5) and (6) the constraint (7) is binding.
Proof. Part (i) follows directly from (5)–(7). Consider now part (ii). The information seller’s revenue,P
i;j rjpijminfp; ½wþ aˆj*riþg, is non-decreasing in p along (5). It is, therefore, sufficient to show that the
maximum price, pˆ, at which the investor does not go for broke, i.e. which satisfies (5), is increasing in a.
Indeed if pˆðaÞ is increasing, the largest a that satisfies both (5) and (7) is optimal. At this a* the
constraint (7) must be binding. From (5) we obtain using the envelope theorem:
pˆV¼ 
P
i
pˆiHV½uð½w pþ aˆuHriþÞ  uð½w pþ wriþÞ
pˆ1HApuð½w pþ aˆuHr1þÞ þ pˆ2HApuð½w pþ aˆuHr2þÞ
: ð8Þ
The denominator of (8) is clearly negative, whereas the numerator is non-negative as a consequence of
pˆ2HV < 0 < pˆ1HV and the difference in square brackets is of the same sign as pˆiHV for all ia{1, 2}. Hence
pˆV> 0, which completes the proof. 5
3.1. Numerical example
Consider an investor with constant absolute risk aversion q and utility function u(w) = exp( qw),
who has initial wealth w and has the option to invest in the return gamble r˜. Let (w, q, r1, r2)=(1, 2/3,  1,
6). Assume that for all ja{L, H} we have rj = 0.5, q1L= 0.8, q1H = 0.2, q2j = 1 q1j. Using these
parameters we find that the posted price making the investor’s individual-rationality constraint (7)Fig. 1. Revenue-increasing garbling of information.
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revenue p¯= 0.145 is given by the right-hand side of (6) and is more than 10% smaller than the posted
price p0. Under a = 0 (no garbling), the amount which can be charged to guarantee zero default is equal
to pˆð0Þ= 0.149, a certain revenue which is strictly larger than p¯while satisfying (5) and (7). Since pˆðaÞ is
increasing in a, the seller can, through garbling, increase his revenues by removing the slack from (7)
without inducing default. By Proposition 1 there exists a strictly revenue-increasing a-garbling (cf. Fig.
1). The optimal garbling a* = 0.014 makes (7) binding, generating a default-free certain revenue of
pˆða*Þ= 0.155 which is more than a 4% gain over pˆð0Þ.
Note that, in our example, moving from ð0; pˆð0ÞÞ to ða*; pˆða*ÞÞ is not a Pareto improvement, as the
investor’s individual-rationality constraint was slack at pˆð0Þ and is binding at pˆða*Þ . If however,
pˆð0Þ < p¯ < pˆða*Þ, then the optimal a*-garbling in the sense of Proposition 1 achieves a weak Pareto
improvement, as the investor’s individual-rationality constraint is binding for aa{0, a*} (i.e. she is
indifferent to the garbling) and the seller’s revenue is strictly higher at a*>0 than at a = 0.4. Discussion
Garbling a signal can be beneficial if an information seller can, by eliminating the investor’s
propensity to overinvest, thereby increase the probability of collecting her payment. In that sense, the
realizable value of the signal can be non-monotonic in its informativeness as delivered. The deliberate
damaging of the seller’s information good through garbling eliminates the investor’s moral hazard
induced by the limited liability for the ex-post payment.
This benefit may outweigh the decrease in the investor’s willingness to pay for a less informative
signal. Our finding that delivering a lower-quality information product leads to higher revenues
resonates with the similarly counter-intuitive negative marginal value of information noted by Cowen
and Glazer (1996), in which less monitoring leads to higher effort in an agency context, as well as
Demski and Sappington (1986) in which potentially useful information is deliberately withheld until
after an agent has made a decision.
We have shown that garbling can be useful for an information seller in combination with a purely ex-
post payment option.7 Naturally, increasing the number of revenue-extraction instruments cannot
decrease revenues, but the result that a seller can achieve a strict revenue improvement by damaging
his one and only information product may still come as a surprise.Acknowledgements
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